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BOOK REVIEWS
EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN—EXCEPT WHAT’S NEW
Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century, by Andrew L� 
Oros� New York: Columbia Univ� Press, 2017� 320 pages� $90�
Andrew Oros, director of international 
studies at Washington College, opens 
his new book provocatively, proclaim-
ing that in security policy “Japan is 
back�” He then describes a series of 
government decisions made in the 
last decade that indicate a shift away 
from Japan’s postwar reliance on 
soft power and economic diplomacy 
toward a more pragmatic and mili-
tarized national security posture�
Oros uses the Western European Renais-
sance as a self-admittedly imperfect 
framework for understanding the 
threshold-crossing transitions that have 
taken place within Japan’s incremental 
evolution� He draws four general paral-
lels between the two renaissances� First, 
both situations blossomed after cul-
tural taboos were challenged in public� 
Second, both were directly related to 
changes in the global order� Third, just 
as Western Europe’s Renaissance was 
entwined with a growth in interest in 
the region’s classical legacy, many groups 
in contemporary Japan are reevaluating 
their views of history, particularly their 
perspectives on the nation’s military 
and cultural accomplishments� Finally, 
both transitional eras were marked by 
significant advances in communications 
technology that enabled a more rapid 
exchange of ideas and greater access 
for previously marginalized sections 
of society to participate in political 
discourse� In Europe, this technology 
was the movable-type printing press; in 
Japan, it is Internet-based social media�
A decade ago, Richard J� Samuels’s 
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy 
and the Future of East Asia (Cornell, 
2007) described the nascent formation 
of a new political consensus in Japan 
under which realpolitik policies would 
supplant the long-standing Yoshida 
Doctrine as the nation’s predominant 
security paradigm� Oros’s book focuses 
on the years since the publication of 
Securing Japan, a period bookended by 
Shinzo Abe’s terms as prime minister, to 
describe a Tokyo where such a consensus 
has taken hold and the security commu-
nity now partakes in “a level of realistic 
and practical discussion of Japan’s 
defense needs unimaginable in previous 
decades�” Japan’s Security Renaissance 
analyzes elements of this new consensus, 
including a series of decisions ranging 
Winter2018Review.indb   159 11/1/17   9:56 AM
1
Bradford and Noland: Book Reviews
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 1 6 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
from the 2007 establishment of the 
Ministry of Defense, the 2009 develop-
ment of Japan’s first overseas military 
base, the 2014 relaxation of arms-export 
controls and a constitutional reinter-
pretation to allow the limited exercise 
of collective self-defense, and the 2016 
security legislation, to the continued 
buildup of advanced defense systems�
The book also makes the important 
point that this shift in thinking is 
not confined to a handful of leaders 
or a single political party, but is 
influential across major parties and 
throughout much of Japan’s policy 
community� Oros explains that these 
changes arrive in a context in which 
Japan is viewed as a declining power 
in Asia, and are underwritten by three 
historical legacies: contested memories 
of imperial Japan and the war, postwar 
antimilitarism, and the unequal nature 
of the alliance with the United States�
Organizing the book into six chapters, 
Oros presents his argument in scholarly, 
but never pedantic, writing� The reader 
is impressed by the author’s knowledge 
and benefits from his large network of 
informed Japanese contacts� In addition, 
his argument is both convincing and 
of considerable significance, given that 
in the same decade the Asian security 
context has grown more complex� The 
author’s largely positive conclusion 
discusses implications for Japan, 
the United States, the Asia-Pacific 
region, and the rest of the world�
Oros also hints, however, at potential 
uncertainty and risk ahead� Contem-
porary students generally view the 
European Renaissance in a positive 
light, as it gave rise to new ways of 
thinking, including the empiricism 
that in turn sowed the seeds for the 
Enlightenment� However, a thorough 
analysis of the Renaissance shows that 
the process was also painful, as seen 
in the wars of religion that ravaged 
Europe in the seventeenth century� 
While Oros does not venture a value 
judgment, he cautions the reader to 
consider some of the more disturbing 
possibilities this new renaissance may 
bring for Japan, the United States, 
and Asia’s delicate security balance�
The book is not without its faults� 
It includes a chapter of theoretical 
reflections that seems a bit misplaced� 
That chapter’s discussions of political 
worldviews lack the foundational 
explanations needed by those without 
training in international relations theory, 
while the narrative descriptions of the 
subsequent chapters will disappoint 
academically inclined readers hoping 
to learn Oros’s thoughts regarding 
the conceptual implications of Japan’s 
new security posture� Perhaps a more 
vexatious complaint is that the author 
relegates valuable information and 
analysis to endnotes, which forces 
the reader to flip pages continually or 
risk missing some of the book’s most 
insightful facts and assessments�
Still, this book will stand out as one 
of the most important studies of the 
Japanese security landscape published 
in English in recent years� A highly 
readable treatment of Japan’s last decade, 
Japan’s Security Renaissance provides 
a useful starting point for those 
seeking to understand what is going 
on in Japan and an essential read for 
specialists keeping track of the many 
changes in Asian security dynamics�
JOHN BRADFORD AND MATT NOLAND
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The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global 
War against Radical Islam and Its Allies, by Mi-
chael T� Flynn and Michael Ledeen� New York: St� 
Martin’s, 2016� 208 pages� $26�99�
General Michael Flynn rose from 
relative obscurity to become President 
Donald Trump’s first national security 
advisor—only to be forced to resign just 
thirty-four days after Trump’s inaugura-
tion� While Flynn’s White House tenure 
was brief, his views align with those 
of Trump’s inner circle—few of whom 
have public writings of their own� 
Flynn’s 2016 book Field of Fight—part 
memoir, part strategic vision—therefore 
provides insight into a White House 
that eschews foreign policy conventions� 
Unfortunately, what Field of Fight 
offers is a breathless portrayal of global 
conspiracies and civilizational clash with 
Islam, and policy recommendations 
not developed much beyond slogans�
Michael T� Flynn is a career Army 
intelligence officer (also an alumnus 
of the Naval War College and a 
Middletown, Rhode Island, native) 
who reached the three-star rank of 
lieutenant general� His coauthor, 
Dr� Michael Ledeen, has authored 
numerous books and articles on U�S� 
Middle East policy� The two are listed 
as coauthors, but the book is written in 
Flynn’s first-person voice throughout�
The first third of Field of Fight is a 
memoir of Flynn’s career� Of greatest 
interest are Flynn’s assignments in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, among them serving 
as chief of intelligence for General 
Stanley A� McChrystal� By all accounts, 
Flynn played a key role in developing 
intelligence-led, quick-exploitation 
operations� Flynn sketches his innova-
tions, offers a few stories, and trumpets 
his “maverick” nature and dislike of 
rules� There are few new insights, 
however� Those interested in the opera-
tional angle will find better treatments 
in recent books by James Kitfield and 
Sean Naylor or McChrystal’s memoir�
The book then shifts to the global threats 
facing America� And a threatening world 
it is, as Flynn and Ledeen see imminent 
existential challenges from terror 
groups such as ISIS and Hezbollah, 
plus rogue nations such as Iran, Russia, 
North Korea, China, Venezuela, Cuba, 
and Bolivia� They contend that these 
actors—Sunni and Shia, Levantine and 
Latin—cooperate as an anti-U�S� axis� 
While dissimilar states and groups do 
sometimes have operational links—e�g�, 
cooperation on sanctions busting—the 
book’s portrayal of an axis is overdrawn� 
Moreover, Flynn seems to use loudness 
of rhetoric rather than capability to 
measure threat� Near-peer China is 
ignored, while worries about basket case 
Venezuela are raised several times�
Flynn considers “radical Islam” the 
primary danger, in that losing the 
fight literally would mean the U�S� 
government overthrown, ISIS’s flag 
over the White House, and 350 mil-
lion Americans either converted or 
beheaded� Tautologically true, perhaps, 
but laughable as serious threat as-
sessment (one recalls the 1984 movie 
Red Dawn)� The definition of radical 
Islam is slippery, but Flynn and Ledeen 
place Iran squarely at the center� They 
contend that the Shia-Sunni divide, let 
alone ethno-national differences, means 
little� ISIS and Al Qaeda are portrayed 
as generally collaborating with senior 
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partner Iran� (Who, then, has been fight-
ing in Iraq and Syria is not clarified�) 
Flynn claims to distinguish between 
radical Islam and Islam as a whole, but 
repeatedly blurs that line, building to a 
four-page jeremiad on the “spectacular 
failure” of the “Muslim world” writ large�
Flynn’s ultimate strategic concept is that 
the United States ought to foster a theo-
logical “reformation” of Islam� Problems 
with the parallel aside—the Christian 
world engaged in global conquests after 
the Reformation—Flynn recognizes that 
the goal is aspirational� Our near-term 
approach should be mostly political, he 
writes� While Flynn emphatically wants 
to “take the gloves off ” counterterror 
operations, he opposes regime change 
by military means, as occurred in Iraq 
and Libya� Instead, top priority would 
be political support of Iranian opposi-
tion groups (coauthor Ledeen long has 
claimed the Iranian regime could be 
brought down rapidly, à la 1989 in East-
ern Europe)� Overall, Flynn’s campaign 
plans are vague and contradictory� The 
threat is imminent and requires World 
War II–style military mobilization, yet it 
will involve a decades-long competition 
of ideas� Promoting liberty and democ-
racy is the key, but the United States 
should back strongly such autocrats as 
Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Flynn is 
curiously opaque about the Saudis, and 
ignores Turkey’s Islamist government)�
Field of Fight was written after Flynn 
became a contributor to Russia’s RT 
network and appeared with Vladimir 
Putin in Moscow, among the Russia 
connections that eventually triggered 
his resignation� Yet Flynn’s book has 
few kind words for Russia: Moscow 
is a leader in the anti-American axis, 
Putin is an aggressor, and President 
Obama failed to criticize Russia strongly 
enough� There are hints, though, that 
Flynn sees potential for rapprochement� 
He says Russia’s true interest would 
be to join the United States against 
Iran and radical Islam, but Russian 
leaders suffer confusion from ingrained 
anti-Americanism and a dearth—Flynn 
asserts—of expertise on Islam� There is 
no suggestion that other “axis” members 
could be played against each other, nor 
much discussed regarding potential 
anti-Islamist allies such as India� Despite 
those hints, the tone of Flynn the author 
is hard to reconcile with the eager Russia 
outreach of Flynn the adviser� Perhaps 
the first-person voice obscures disagree-
ment with coauthor Ledeen, who in 
his own works is dubious of Moscow—
probably the more realistic view�
Overall, the book is thinly sourced� 
Many claims simply are asserted, and the 
few references often point to bloggers, 
op-ed writers, or advocacy groups� 
The book makes no pretense of being 
scholarly, but even a general audience 
would benefit from more evidence—and 
more fact-checking� As one example, 
Flynn and Ledeen claim that seven to 
thirteen million people of Lebanese 
ancestry live in the Brazil-Paraguay-
Argentina triborder region, whereas 
the correct number is around 25,000�
As a work of strategy, Field of Fight is 
forgettable� The literatures on jihadism, 
Iran, illicit transnational networks, 
etc�, are replete with more-thoughtful, 
well-researched works� The recom-
mendations seem more intended to 
back up campaign speeches than to 
support actionable plans� As a window 
into the Trump administration’s national 
security thinking, the book provides 
value—but not much reassurance�
DAVID T� BURBACH
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Designing Gotham: West Point Engineers and the 
Rise of Modern New York, 1817–1898, by Jon 
Scott Logel� Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ� 
Press, 2016� 280 pages� $45�
The idea of civil-military relations 
generally is framed in terms of the 
relationship between the government of 
a state and the military that serves that 
state� Whether the construct is the objec-
tive control posed by Samuel Huntington 
or the unequal dialogue of Eliot Cohen, 
the discussion largely focuses on how 
the civilian sector influences the actions 
of the military� In his new volume, 
Designing Gotham, Jon Scott Logel offers 
a window on a long-neglected aspect 
of the relationship: how the military 
wields influence in civilian society�
The book begins with an interesting 
account of the rise of Sylvanus Thayer 
and his vision for refashioning West 
Point into the first institution of higher 
education in the United States dedicated 
to teaching the principles of engineer-
ing� Professor Logel also discusses the 
inherent tensions between Thayer’s 
narrow view of a curriculum focused 
on military engineering and the public 
clamor of the Jacksonian era for West 
Point to graduate engineers trained 
in civil engineering� The compromise 
solution—adding a limited number 
of civil-engineering courses to the 
program at the academy—set the stage 
for the influence of West Pointers on 
the development of New York City� 
It is the influence of these men that 
forms the core emphasis of the book�
Through a series of well-crafted 
chapters, Logel describes the influence 
of U�S� Military Academy graduates 
on both the professionalization of 
engineering and a series of projects 
that helped shape modern New York� 
Tracing the progress of these public 
works, the chapters also trace the social 
and political changes in the relationship 
between the military-trained engineers 
and the civilian society in which they 
moved� The dramatic increase in 
political involvement by these officers 
after the Civil War is another subtheme� 
Weaving these ideas together, the book 
offers an interesting social history of 
the effects these military men had on 
New York society and the effects society 
had on these West Pointers� The cast of 
characters is populated with men made 
famous by the Civil War, such as George 
B� McClellan and Fitz-John Porter, as 
well as more-obscure graduates such as 
Egbert L� Viele and John Newton, who 
arguably were more important in the 
development of the city’s infrastructure�
The author does not delve deeply into 
the details of the engineering projects� 
This is not necessarily a shortcoming, 
as the development of engineering as 
a profession, not its development as a 
science, is a theme of the work� If the 
book has a weakness, it is the graphics� 
The only maps are reproductions of 
Viele’s famous “Water Map” of 1865 
and his plan for Central Park� A map 
highlighting the various projects might 
have been more valuable than the 
common, recognizable photos of Porter 
and McClellan that are included�
Jon Scott Logel has offered a unique 
perspective on the relationship between 
civil society and the graduates of West 
Point� His insights remind us that, while 
our civil government controls the mili-
tary in the United States, our military 
institutions have a powerful influence 
on our society—recognized or not�
KEVIN J� DELAMER
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Duel au large: La guerre de Sécession devant 
Cherbourg (19 juin 1864); Enquête et récit, by 
Jacky Desquesnes� Condé-sur-Noireau: Éditions 
Charles Corlet, 2014. 247 pages� $20 paperback�
Jacky Desquesnes’s book on the Civil 
War naval battle between CSS Alabama 
and USS Kearsarge is a useful contribu-
tion to understanding that event� The 
book’s publication coincided with the 
150th anniversary of the battle, an event 
the French press covered extensively in a 
nationally circulated magazine, L’express, 
and well-known regional newspapers 
such as La Manche libre, La presse de la 
Manche, and Ouest-France. Although the 
book was published in France more than 
three years ago by a regional publisher, 
it seems to have been ignored entirely 
in the United States and by American 
naval historians� At the time of this 
review’s writing, WorldCat showed only 
one library in the United States that had 
acquired a copy: Harvard University’s�
Numerous other books deal with this 
subject—in English� The author has used 
most of the standard American docu-
mentary sources in print, as well as the 
digital materials now available online� 
Among these are the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Navies 
in the War of the Rebellion and the 
published memoirs of the participants, 
plus one unpublished memoir from the 
collection at Mystic Seaport� While the 
author does not cite all the published 
secondary sources in English that he 
might have used, the book’s importance 
is in its use of French sources that 
American scholars have consulted 
only rarely� Chief among these are the 
reports of the battle in the local and 
national French press and the archives 
of the French navy (series BB4 1346)�
Desquesnes, currently a lecturer at 
the Université populaire de Caen in 
Normandy and formerly a regional 
inspector of pedagogy, has placed his 
subject in the wide context of the 
Civil War, Franco-American relations, 
international law, and the concept of 
the duel� Many people at Cherbourg 
observed the action, and their impres-
sions appeared in the popular press� 
In French eyes, Raphael Semmes 
seemed a gentleman who fought the 
battle like a classic duel, and the press 
popularized this metaphor, which the 
maritime prefect at Cherbourg used to 
describe the action as he observed it�
In his closing chapter, Desquesnes 
makes an important contribution in 
discussing the cultural afterlife of the 
battle in memory and commemoration� 
In this, he places Édouard Manet’s mas-
terful painting of the event within the 
wider context of the popular images of 
the day� He goes on to discuss the local 
monuments, mentioning the unknown 
grave site at Cherbourg of William 
Carpenter of Alabama and the surviving 
and restored monuments of George 
Appleby, William Gowin, and Edward 
King, along with the commemorations 
held there over the years� Interestingly, 
he points out connections that have 
developed among these sites and those 
of American war dead in other parts of 
France, from John Paul Jones’s sailors at 
Nantes to those lost in the First World 
War� The volume ends with a brief 
discussion of the work of Captain Max 
Guérout of the French navy, the CSS 
Alabama associations in Washington 
and Paris, and the underwater archaeol-
ogy that led to the recovery of many 
objects from the wreck of Alabama�
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Jacky Desquesnes’s volume makes a 
useful contribution to the literature, 
one that deserves to be read more 
widely by American naval historians� 
It is also a reminder of the value and 
importance of the insights for naval 
history that are readily available in other 
languages, but too often are overlooked�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collec-
tive Defence, ed� John Andreas Olsen� Whitehall 
Paper 87� London: RUSI, released by Taylor and 
Francis, 2017� 104 pages� $13�55 paperback�
As Russia’s naval posture and its restored 
naval and air capabilities have become 
more evident, the North Atlantic has 
reemerged over the last couple of years 
as a hot topic for researchers� For two 
decades the region and the idea of high-
end naval threats to the NATO allies 
were almost entirely off the table, but 
the North Atlantic has reemerged as a 
key topic in NATO headquarters as well� 
Both the Wales Summit Declaration 
(2014) and the Warsaw Summit Declara-
tion (2016) bring forward the North 
Atlantic as a renewed area of concern�
However, NATO and American allies 
largely lack the capabilities to deal with 
the increased threat that Russia’s new 
and modernized capabilities pose� Rus-
sia’s long-term intentions are difficult 
to assess, and most likely will change 
over time anyway� Still, there are some 
geopolitical constants, and it is possible 
—and important—to notice, keep track 
of, and understand the current threats 
and potential future ones as they evolve� 
Naval and air capabilities take a long 
time to develop, with regard to both 
technology and competency� Naval 
strategists and readers should reconsider 
this reemerging challenge, and several 
new reports from think tanks in the 
United States and the United Kingdom 
provide a good starting point�
Highly recommended are the following 
recent publications: “Updating NATO’s 
Maritime Strategy” (Atlantic Council, 
2016); Undersea Warfare in Northern 
Europe (CSIS, 2016); NATO and the 
North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective 
Defence (RUSI Whitehall Paper 87, 
2017); and “Forgotten Waters: Minding 
the GIUK Gap” (CNAS, 2017)� Each of 
these is beneficial, but readers should 
note especially the present book under 
review, NATO and the North Atlantic. It 
is edited by John Andreas Olsen, con-
tains a foreword by Philip M� Breedlove 
and an introduction and conclusion by 
Olsen, and consists of six chapters�
Olsen is an experienced book editor, 
always getting high-level experts on 
board his projects� For this project he 
has created a good team of experienced 
North Atlantic and Russian military 
experts from both sides of the Atlantic� 
The book connects historical and 
geopolitical military perspectives with 
more-current “post-Brexit” conse-
quences and modern hybrid threats�
In his chapter, “The Significance of 
the North Atlantic and the Norwegian 
Contribution,” Rolf Tamnes brings back 
the classical “bastion concept” for the 
protection of Russian strategic subma-
rines� Even though nuclear deterrence 
has been off the radar of academics 
and strategists for a couple of decades, 
it has always “been there�” We clearly 
should give more attention to this fact, 
and try to understand and appreciate 
how the nuclear deterrence forces of 
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today shape how the great powers play, 
be it in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere�
As John J� Hamre and Heather A� Conley 
argue in their chapter, “The Centrality 
of the North Atlantic to NATO and US 
Strategic Interests,” the North Atlantic 
is in fact the ocean that physically and 
metaphorically binds North America 
and Europe together� The book’s focus 
and main themes are intended to explain 
this to readers and to argue that NATO 
must retain the capability to secure 
freedom of maneuver across the sea 
and keep the waterways between the 
continents open for reinforcement and 
resupply of matériel and personnel 
in times of peace, crisis, and war� The 
alliance, as a guarantor of national sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, must 
be prepared to counter any potential 
threat to the North Atlantic Ocean�
As do the studies recommended above 
on Russia and the North Atlantic, 
this project clearly points out Russia’s 
increasingly provocative rhetoric and be-
havior over the last few years� Coupling 
this with the fact that Russia has 
introduced new classes of conventional 
and nuclear attack submarines and is 
modernizing its Northern Fleet through 
the addition of long-range, high-
precision missiles provides great reason 
for concern� The Russian navy could 
challenge NATO’s command of the 
high seas, and thereby put both Europe 
and North America at existential risk�
The book argues that now is the time 
for NATO and American allies to get 
a grip on the strategically important 
North Atlantic Ocean, in addition to 
the current, very Eurocentric focus on 
air and land forces in the Baltic States 
and on Russia’s land borders� The North 
Atlantic is in fact the northwestern part 
of the current NATO 360 perspective, 
but it needs to be reckoned as such� The 
challenges in the North Atlantic are of a 
very different nature from those NATO 
experiences in the east and south, but no 
less important� Arguably, in the longer 
perspective, these high-end threats 
may prove existential, and need to be 
acknowledged� It takes a long time to 
develop the countertechnologies and 
expertise necessary to meet Russia’s 
modernization of its submarines and 
missile systems� Fittingly, the last 
chapter before the conclusion and 
recommendations is Admiral James 
Stavridis’s “The United States, the North 
Atlantic and Maritime Hybrid Warfare�”
In the concluding chapter, Olsen 
offers some clear recommendations, 
arguing that NATO should renew 
its maritime strategy, reintroduce 
extensive maritime exercises and 
sustained presence, reform its com-
mand structure, invest in maritime 
capabilities and situational awareness, 
enhance maritime partnerships, and 
prepare for maritime hybrid warfare�
Overall, this book provides an 
excellent starting point from which 
to start discussing the North Atlantic 
challenges that are emerging as the 
Russian naval (and air) forces con-
tinue to make considerable progress 
toward modernizing for the future�
GJERT LAGE DYNDAL
The Leader’s Bookshelf, by Admiral James Stavri-
dis, USN (Ret�), and R� Manning Ancell� Annap-
olis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 272 pages� 
$29�95�
The Leader’s Bookshelf is unique in its 
style and structure and outstanding in 
its personal and confident presentation� 
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There are literally hundreds of books 
on leadership, including memoirs of 
former CEOs, guidebooks to leader-
ship from professional athletes, and 
personal commentaries from men and 
women who have succeeded in their 
fields of business, education, politics, 
and government; but this presentation 
is different� Admiral Stavridis, whose 
culminating military assignment was as 
supreme allied commander at NATO, 
and his highly competent coauthor, 
R� Manning Ancell, have designed a 
wide-ranging collection of books and 
essays within a relatively brief volume 
that exudes commitment to meeting the 
challenges of leadership and confidence 
regarding the qualities necessary�
The content and structure of the book 
are what make it different, especially 
worthwhile, and a great reading experi-
ence� The method taken was to invite 
each of fifty different military leaders 
to recommend his or her favorite book 
on leadership and explain the reasons 
for the choice� The coauthors add brief 
comments about the book’s author 
and the book itself, and select brief 
quotations and passages from the 
recommended work� But the heart of 
the work is the “Leadership Lessons 
Summarized,” which are developed and 
summarized by Stravridis or Manning� 
Suffice it to say, the quality and value of 
these lessons learned are truly inspiring�
The range and diversity of the fifty 
recommended books are remarkable� 
Military leaders, mostly contemporaries 
and colleagues of the coauthors, have 
recommended authors and books as 
varied as Rudyard Kipling’s Captains 
Courageous and William Manchester’s 
Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the 
Pacific War� The recommended authors 
include Carl von Clausewitz, Sun 
Tzu, Mark Twain, S� L� A� Marshall, 
Harper Lee, Thomas L� Friedman, 
H� R� McMaster, and dozens more� 
This book can be a great companion 
on deployments—it can be rejoined 
quickly after interruptions�
While the fifty presentations are 
the heart of the book, much more is 
included that is highly valuable but 
unfortunately not discussed widely and 
presented only infrequently� These five 
brief chapters—“Reading Lists,” “Writing 
and Publishing,” “What Young Leaders 
Are Reading,” “Building a Personal 
Library,” and “Reading and Writing: The 
Big Lessons”—are the “secret passages” 
to success, clues to how not just to get 
promoted but to live an enriched and 
meaningful life� These chapters show 
Admiral Stavridis’s own passion and 
commitment to his profession and his 
important, mentor-like dedication to 
midrange professionals who aim high 
and try harder to become great leaders�
“But wait, there’s more!”—a bonus, so to 
speak� An afterword offers an important 
discussion of how more-formal litera-
ture, specifically poems and plays, can 
provide valuable leadership lessons� In 
“A Play and Two Poems,” Admiral Stavri-
dis writes (p� 259), “In terms of impact, 
word-for-word, a beautifully crafted 
poem can deliver the most meaningful 
of reading experiences and provide star-
tling insights for a reader� Plays, which 
are of course essentially scripts written 
to be performed in front of us, often 
give us powerful voices to listen to and 
therefore sharpen our leadership skills�”
In a brief but brilliant analysis of The 
Persians by Aeschylus, William Butler 
Yeats’s poem “The Second Coming,” and 
Constantine P� Cavafy’s poem “Sailing to 
Ithaca,” Admiral Stavridis describes the 
intense and deep revelation of meaning 
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attained through creative literature and 
recommends the challenge of develop-
ing an active, creative imagination in 
reading intellectual literature as an 
important role of leaders� He writes 
(p� 266) that “in the end the very best 
effective leaders use hope to inspire 
us in the long voyages on which we all 
must sail� Poems and plays each have 
a role in helping leaders find their way 
not only to challenges, but to hope�”
At a program sponsored by the Naval 
War College Foundation a few years 
ago, Admiral Stavridis commented that 
during his tour of duty as Commander, 
Southern Command, he arranged to 
be tutored daily in Spanish because 
he thought a better understanding of 
the language essential to the success 
of his mission� This was a singular 
commitment to effective leadership, 
just as The Leader’s Bookshelf is a 
singular and valuable contribution 
to developing effective leaders�
JOHN J� SALESSES
A Tale of Two Navies: Geopolitics, Technology, and 
Strategy in the United States Navy and the Royal 
Navy, 1960–2015, by Anthony R� Wells� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 264 pages� 
$35�
At its heart, this book both espouses 
the value of a global maritime strategy 
as seen from the perspective of two 
historically close allies, Great Britain and 
the United States, and acknowledges the 
enormous costs of maintaining one� It is 
not a history book, although it covers a 
historical period and provides context� 
It is more of a thematic illustration of 
the extraordinary measures necessary—
across the entire span of professional 
and political discourses—to nurture and 
maintain such partnerships� Above all, 
it highlights the need for trust: a shared 
understanding of goals and a willingness 
to cooperate at all levels that rises above 
what the author terms “the minefield 
of opponents, skeptics and those with 
ill-conceived agendas � � � who simply 
have little or no knowledge of the basics 
of maritime strategy�” Given the current 
interest in enhancing naval presence 
and the consequent drive toward an 
enlarged naval fleet, this is a timely 
message and one that deserves careful 
consideration from naval professionals�
Anthony Wells is perhaps uniquely 
qualified for this work� As an intel-
ligence specialist, he has served both in 
the Royal Navy (RN) in uniform and 
later for the U�S� Navy as a civilian ana-
lyst, and has been involved personally in 
much “special intelligence sharing at the 
most sensitive levels�” His first chapter, 
by far the most valuable, outlines the po-
litical changes that took place during the 
1960s and ’70s, particularly in Britain, 
that fundamentally altered the way in 
which naval concerns were represented 
to Parliament� He explains that although 
both countries’ defense establishments 
underwent considerable “centralization” 
after the Second World War, the loss 
of hundreds of years of naval influence 
in the cabinet of Great Britain caused 
by the sidelining of the First Lord of 
the Admiralty in 1946 in favor of the 
defense minister, and the eventual loss 
of the service ministries altogether in 
1964, was immensely damaging to the 
maritime case� It is no coincidence, 
for example, that these years saw 
the reorientation of British defense 
policy away from global responsibilities 
and toward an exclusively northern 
European focus� This in turn led to the 
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demise of the RN aircraft carrier fleet 
and loss of RN influence “east of Suez,” 
adding to the urgency with which the 
service sought partnerships with the 
only global player remaining, the U�S� 
Navy� Although similar “centralization” 
efforts were under way in Washington, 
Wells explains that the U�S� Navy was 
inherently better served, in that the 
crucial contact between senior serving 
officers and their political masters was 
preserved by virtue of the former’s 
ability to testify to influential congres-
sional committees� In this way, the 
maritime case continued and continues 
to be represented in Washington�
Throughout all these upheavals, the 
real saving grace was the professional 
links between the two navies that had 
been forged during the dark years of the 
world wars� The urgency of the Cold 
War competition with Soviet Russia and 
the need to know the opponent’s plans 
years in advance meant that, to stay 
ahead, the burgeoning technological 
energy of the United States needed to 
be combined with the long-established 
human-intelligence resources of the 
United Kingdom� To effect this, both 
navies continued to talk, no matter 
what tensions were extant nationally 
and internationally at the time� As the 
Soviets increasingly emphasized their 
submarine fleet as a means by which to 
conduct nuclear bargaining, Wells was in 
a prime position to observe and record 
this exchange� In the remaining chapters 
he charts some of the high and low 
points by way of illustration: the acoustic 
refining of the nuclear submarine, the 
use of maritime forces to signal resolve 
during the Six-Day War of 1967, the 
damage caused by the Walker spy ring, 
and the extensive cooperation during the 
Falklands War in 1982, to name a few�
In the end, the sheer importance 
of the subject matter and its timely 
appearance will ensure wide reader-
ship of this book—which is a good 
thing� Wells, although fluent, is not an 
overly engaging writer, and the factual 
nature of the prose can result in quite a 
mouthful at times� That said, the work is 
well researched and accurate, although 
no doubt still limited by ongoing 
classification issues� Uncharacteristically, 
however, the normally flawless Naval In-
stitute editorial process has allowed in a 
few grammatical errors and, in the Falk-
lands chapter, a minor inaccuracy� The 
Argentines had four, not three, diesel 
submarines in 1982: two Type 209s and 
two old, ex-USN Balao-class Guppy II 
conversions� Of these, only one of each 
was serviceable, and ARA Santa Fe was 
of the Balao class (ex–USS Catfish), not 
a Type 209 as stated on page 147� Luck-
ily, none of these errors detracts in any 
way from the theme being presented�
This book should be read and 
discussed by anyone with an interest 
in maritime strategy or the “special 
relationship” between the two countries� 
This special relationship endures, of 
course, and no doubt in a few years’ 
time—once the ships of the Queen 
Elizabeth class and their F-35Cs are 
in service—the next chapter in this 
cooperative story will be told�
ANGUS ROSS
Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War 
in Vietnam, by Mark Bowden� New York: Atlantic 
Monthly, 2017� 610 pages� $30�
The United States first committed combat-
size units (battalions or larger) to the 
war in Vietnam in March 1965� In the 
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years that followed, as the United States 
assumed a greater role in the fighting, its 
forces in theater continued to grow� By 
early 1968, the United States had several 
hundred thousand troops in Vietnam�
Concurrently, North Vietnam’s 
leadership was supporting a grow-
ing communist insurgency in the 
south—that of the Vietcong (VC)—the 
goal of which was to defeat South 
Vietnam and bring it under the North’s 
communist regime� To accelerate this 
process, North Vietnam developed an 
elaborate plan to infiltrate thousands of 
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops 
into South Vietnam and, with the VC, 
capture and hold South Vietnam’s major 
cities and U�S� and South Vietnamese 
military installations� No objective was 
given a higher priority than the old 
imperial Vietnamese capital of Hue�
The resulting Tet Offensive was, without 
exception, a battlefield loss for NVA 
and VC forces� However, Tet was a 
decisive communist victory on the 
political front: it turned the American 
public irrevocably against the war� 
America’s support for the Vietnam 
conflict and its trust in its elected, 
appointed, and military leaders—already 
on shaky ground by early 1968—would 
become permanent casualties of the 
Tet Offensive and the battle for Hue�
In the early morning hours of January 
31, 1968, the first day of Tet (the lunar 
new year), nearly ten thousand well-
trained, dedicated, and motivated NVA 
and VC troops clandestinely moved 
from neighboring forested highlands 
into Hue� By noon, with the exception 
of a couple of Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (i�e�, ARVN) units and the 
Military Advisory Command, Vietnam 
(i�e�, MACV) compound, the city was in 
communist hands� It would take nearly 
a month of bitter street fighting and 
thousands of casualties (the vast major-
ity to civilians) to return the city to the 
control of South Vietnam’s government�
Mark Bowden’s day-by-day chronicle of 
the battle to retake Hue is detailed and 
precise and covers both sides� He closely 
follows Lieutenant Colonel Ernest “Big 
Ernie” Cheatham, the commanding 
officer of 2/5 (2nd Battalion, 5th Marine 
Regiment), whose area of responsibility 
was south of the Citadel and the Huong 
River—an expanse that included Hue 
University, the treasury building, the 
provincial headquarters, a prison, a 
hospital complex, and several other 
structures� Cheatham’s basic tactic was 
to employ tanks, self-propelled “Ontos” 
antitank vehicles (each carried six deadly 
106 mm recoilless rifles), bazookas, 
81 mm mortars, flamethrowers, and 
gas to destroy the buildings across 
contested streets, while his young 
infantrymen prepared for the assault� 
It was an effective strategy: his rifle 
companies were able to advance� It 
took his battalion four days to fight 
from Route 1 to the Phu Cam Canal�
On the other side, Bowden focuses on 
VC lieutenant Hoang Anh De, com-
manding Battalion 55, who gave ground 
only grudgingly� Like many of his fellow 
NVA/VC leaders, as well as the senior 
leadership in Hanoi, he soon realized 
that the expected popular uprising was 
not going to happen� However, like his 
compatriots, he knew that the longer he 
could keep the battle in Hue going, the 
greater the political victory would be�
Combat operations for control of the 
city continued until nearly the end of 
February� Major Bob Thompson’s 1/1 
(1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment), 
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assigned the mission of retaking the 
Citadel on February 11, suffered nearly 
50 percent casualties by February 15� 
Nonetheless, the battalion successfully 
fought from the north to the south 
Citadel walls, then west to retake the 
royal palace and its grounds� Outside the 
Citadel and to the northwest, elements 
of the U�S� Army’s 1st Air Cavalry Divi-
sion were assigned the task of attacking 
the NVA Front’s command center in the 
village of La Chu� One battalion suffered 
50 percent casualties in the effort; 
subsequent attacks prevailed as the com-
munist forces initiated an orderly retreat�
While intelligence on the NVA/VC 
forces that captured Hue was not good, 
at least initially, Bowden nonetheless is 
critical of the senior leaders who failed 
to see the obvious� Of General William 
C� Westmoreland he writes, “Never had 
a general so effectively willed away the 
facts�” Westmoreland simply refused to 
accept that the NVA/VC actually had 
captured the city� Bowden notes that 
the general “continually and falsely 
assured political leaders in Washington 
and the public that the city had not 
fallen into enemy hands�” Brigadier 
General Foster C� LaHue, the com-
manding general of Task Force X-Ray 
(Marines), was little better, insisting that 
“there was nothing more threatening 
in Hue than a handful of snipers�”
Bowden has crafted a comprehensive 
and accurate account of the battle to 
wrest Hue from the NVA and VC� In his 
source notes he writes, “For a journalist 
interested in history the sweet spot is 
about 50 years� Enough time has gone by 
for a measure of historical perspective 
and yet there remain many living wit-
nesses�” Bowden personally interviewed 
hundreds of them, in the process 
crafting several compelling portraits 
of the junior Marines who faced their 
NVA/VC adversaries at very close range� 
The testimonies of large numbers of 
witnesses (in addition to unclassified 
and formerly classified reports from the 
National Archives, the Marine Corps 
Library at Quantico, Virginia, and other 
sources) serve to enhance the accuracy 
of the narrative� And from what this 
reviewer (who spent February 1968 in 
Hue with 2/5) can tell, the accuracy of 
Bowden’s narrative is unquestionable� 
He has produced an excellent read of a 
defining period in our nation’s history�
GEORGE HOFMANN
By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and 
American Power in the Asia Pacific since 1783, 
by Michael J� Green� New York: Columbia Univ� 
Press, 2017� 760 pages� $45�
In the fast-moving world of Washington, 
DC, capturing and conveying the 
context of policy choices challenge even 
the most committed national security 
professional� For busy senior officials, 
policy can seem to exist in historical 
isolation, with institutional memory 
rarely extending before the start of 
the current administration� Resources 
for understanding rarely address the 
contingencies and considerations that 
drove those who went before us�
Michael Green, author of By More 
Than Providence, confronted this 
problem as senior director for Asia 
on the National Security Council a 
decade ago� Arriving as an academic 
with a deep background in the region, 
he nonetheless was challenged to place 
proposed policy initiatives in the context 
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of America’s long relationship with 
Asia� On returning to academia, Green 
set out to write the book he wished 
he had had as a policy adviser� The 
result is an extraordinary overview of 
how America crafted itself as a Pacific 
nation, gaining its unique position in the 
region, as the title states, “by more than 
providence�” Since its birth, America has 
been tied to the Pacific by “commerce, 
faith, geography, and self-defense” in a 
dynamic interplay of interests, hopes, 
and fears� The process of balancing these 
forces is the focus of Green’s work, and 
his approach underscores the imperfect 
nature of any effort to address complex 
goals in a region of such diversity�
The overall U�S� policy focus historically 
has swung between Europe and Asia, 
with Europe benefiting from linguistic 
and cultural affinities among American 
elites� Within Asia, U�S� policy makers 
have cycled between China and Japan 
when prioritizing relations� These 
fundamental choices, still at play in 
the region, date to the earliest days of 
the United States� In considering this 
dynamic, Green benefits from his early 
academic career as a Japan specialist� In 
an increasingly China-focused field, this 
distinctive background allows him to 
place America’s critical relationship with 
Japan in proper context and provides 
an antidote to recent works that place 
too much emphasis on China issues�
Even well-read naval professionals will 
be struck by the central role that mari-
time issues and the U�S� Navy play in the 
narrative� From the creation of the first 
USN Pacific squadron in 1821, naval 
leaders have been a key outward face of 
the nation to the region and one of the 
constant interlocutors in internal U�S� 
debates� Indeed, Green credits Mahan 
with articulating the first comprehensive 
U�S� grand strategy for the Pacific 
region, tracing his influence through 
to the present� More recently, the 
Reagan administration’s Soviet-focused 
Maritime Strategy had its intellectual 
roots firmly in the Pacific as the then 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
Admiral Thomas B� Hayward, sought to 
address a growing Soviet Pacific Fleet� 
Hayward moved on to become Chief of 
Naval Operations and, paired with John 
Lehman as Secretary of the Navy, pushed 
the strategy into global execution� Naval 
professionals versed in military history 
and security issues will benefit from 
the book’s integrated and thoughtful 
discussion of economic and cultural ties�
By More Than Providence provides a 
balance between conceptual argument 
and the details of historic events� For 
example, while placing Nixon’s opening 
to China in broad context, Green also 
provides an excellent articulation of the 
assumptions behind the negotiation and 
signing of the Shanghai Communiqué� 
His personal experience in the policy 
arena has given him a sympathetic ear 
for the challenges our predecessors 
faced and their often-imperfect efforts� 
There is criticism of many decision 
makers across numerous eras, but always 
tempered with a welcome sense that 
meaningful statecraft is simply hard� 
Despite that fact, America has achieved 
and sustained a unique position in the 
Pacific� Green’s sense of contingency—
that events could have unfolded very 
differently and the U�S� position in the 
region might be weaker or nonexistent 
—presents the American reader with 
a clear if implied challenge: how to 
maintain this legacy going forward�
At well over seven hundred pages and 
exquisitely sourced with notes and 
comments, By More Than Providence 
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represents a substantial investment 
of time and effort for the thoughtful 
reader� It is, however, an essential book 
for any naval professional who wants 
to understand what lies in our wake 
before charting our course in Asia�
DALE C� RIELAGE
The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Ser-
vice since 1945, by Peter Hennessy and James 
Jinks� London: Penguin, 2015� 864 pages� £30�
The Silent Deep is a tell-all history of the 
Royal Navy’s submarine service since 
World War II� The authors were granted 
almost unlimited access to Royal Navy 
(RN) historical files of submarine opera-
tions� The discussion of formerly classi-
fied operational surveillance patrols off 
the North Cape of Norway and of the 
trailing of Soviet nuclear-powered attack 
submarines (SSNs) and nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) is 
eye-opening� As a former USN subma-
rine commanding officer—and a veteran 
of eight covert surveillance operations in 
the Pacific during the Cold War—I was 
stunned to read about British submarine 
operations in the “other ocean�”
The book is much more than that, 
though� It begins with a description 
of the “Perisher” (slang name for the 
Submarine Command Course), a 
demanding five-month-long training 
program for potential submarine com-
manding officers� Successful graduates 
normally go on to command; those 
dropped for lack of demonstrated ability 
generally leave the submarine service�
The authors describe the startling effect 
on the Royal Navy of gaining access 
to German submarine technology 
at the end of World War II and the 
ensuing revelation of the very advanced 
submarines that were being prepared to 
attack Allied warships and shipping� The 
German Type XXI high-speed, long- 
endurance, diesel-electric submarine was 
arguably the first modern submarine—a 
truly submersible warship� By the war’s 
end over a hundred Type XXIs were 
working up in the Baltic Sea, but they 
made no operational patrols� In fact, 
only one operational patrol was made 
by a boat of this class—U-2511—and 
the war ended before it could make an 
attack� (A number of Type XXIIIs, the 
smaller clones of the Type XXIs, did 
make operational patrols and sank nine 
ships without loss to their own ranks�)
The Type XXI boat was the model for 
postwar development of advanced-
capability diesel-electric submarines 
in three navies: the British Porpoise 
class, the Soviet Whiskey class, and 
the American Tang class�
Another German revelation was the 
Walther boat, a hydrogen peroxide– 
fueled true submarine, which had not 
yet become operational� A captured 
Walther-class submarine, U-1407, was 
commissioned as HMS Meteorite, and 
its trials led to the construction and 
commissioning of HMS Excalibur 
and HMS Explorer, both powered 
by Walther-cycle machinery� They 
turned out to be a dead end, however, 
as technical problems and financial 
concerns ended the experiments�
The authors also cover the Royal 
Navy’s first looks at nuclear power for 
submarines and its temporary abandon-
ment in favor of the Walther-cycle 
propulsion plant� When that avenue 
proved fruitless, the Royal Navy then 
turned to the United States—which had 
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put the first nuclear-powered submarine, 
USS Nautilus (SSN 571), to sea in 1955� 
In a major exercise named RUM TUB in 
October 1957, Nautilus showed convinc-
ingly that RN antisubmarine warfare 
ships and aircraft were totally unable 
to detect and track an SSN, owing to 
its almost unlimited endurance�
The British decisions to acquire 
SSNs and subsequently SSBNs are 
discussed in separate chapters, each 
offering an in-depth look at the design, 
engineering, management, and political 
aspects of the respective programs�
The Falklands War of 1982 offered 
an opportunity for the Royal Navy 
to employ SSNs in a limited-area, 
limited-combat role� The Royal Navy’s 
SSNs were the first British warships on 
scene after the Argentine invasion of 
the Falkland Islands� They provided 
essential surveillance and intelligence 
reporting about Argentine forces� On 
May 2, 1982, HMS Conqueror sank ARA 
General Belgrano, an Argentine navy 
light cruiser, south of the Falklands� 
That sinking effectively drove other 
Argentine navy units back inside their 
twelve-mile limit, a boundary British 
SSNs were not allowed to penetrate—a 
political constraint the British placed 
on themselves, and one that was very 
frustrating to SSN commanding officers 
who were anxious to engage Argentina’s 
aircraft carrier, which posed a significant 
threat to the British surface task force� 
The reviewer was fortunate to have had 
lunch recently with HMS Conqueror’s 
navigating officer and to query him di-
rectly about the decision of Conqueror’s 
commanding officer to use Second 
World War–vintage Mark 8 torpedoes 
instead of the much more advanced 
Mark 24 Tigerfish torpedoes—a decision 
discussed in the Falklands chapter�
Subsequent chapters deal with the 
complicated internal British politics of 
upgrading the Royal Navy’s submarine 
deterrent force from Polaris to 
Poseidon, and finally to current-day 
Trident missiles, as well as the continu-
ing operations vis-à-vis Russia�
This is an outstanding book, well 
researched and ably written� I highly 
recommend it for anyone interested in 
submarine operations or antisubmarine 
warfare or both� It is a must-read�
JOHN F� O’CONNELL
21st Century Gorshkov: The Challenge of Sea 
Power in the Modern Era, ed� Kevin Rowlands� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 192 
pages� $21�95 paperback�
The published works of Soviet fleet 
admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov, 
whose naval career spanned three 
decades, are ostensibly the subject of 
this volume edited by the Royal Navy’s 
Kevin Rowlands� Yet the book also could 
serve as a blueprint for increasing naval 
prestige, power, and influence� Through 
the focus on Gorshkov’s writing, the 
reader is afforded an insider’s view 
of the Soviet navy’s post–World War 
and Cold War–era growth� At the 
same time, Rowlands is interested 
in how consideration of Gorshkov 
can help inform questions about the 
future roles and uses of naval force�
Admiral Gorshkov graduated from 
the Frunze Naval School in Leningrad 
in 1931 and showed early promise 
as a naval officer� His role in the 
Second World War was as impressive 
as his peacetime advancement� Unlike 
many of his peers, Gorshkov not only 
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achieved great responsibility as a young 
officer but was able to weather the 
many changes in the Soviet political 
environment and emerged as a leading 
practitioner and theorist of Soviet naval 
strategy� In essence, Admiral Gorshkov’s 
performance as a naval officer becomes 
a model for all who aspire to make a 
lasting contribution to the naval profes-
sion and to the security of one’s country�
Perhaps Admiral Gorshkov’s major 
military contribution was making the 
Soviet navy the most powerful navy in 
Russian history� For example, prior to 
his leadership the Soviet navy basically 
had as its major responsibility coastal-
defense matters, but Admiral Gorshkov 
changed that by building the service’s 
capabilities and expanding its role to 
worldwide responsibility and activity� By 
modernizing the navy and adopting new 
technological devices, he substantially 
increased its power, enabling it to take 
a first-class position in the world� He 
constantly tested new naval capabilities 
and adjusted to make improvements, 
recognizing that there were good 
reasons to do so; after all, other nations 
were making important and substantial 
changes to their navies� Gorshkov’s 
skills helped the Soviet Union achieve 
remarkable influence in the world; his 
bureaucratic skills also helped him gain 
respect and cooperation when he was 
involved with military representatives 
of other countries� The importance of 
this characteristic is becoming quite 
evident in today’s American military�
Admiral Gorshkov was also a patient 
politician regarding his role as a naval 
leader� “When cuts had to be made, he 
made them� When there were opportu-
nities for growth, he took them” (p� 5)� 
In addition, he had the ability—even 
when the Soviet navy appeard to be 
discredited, as in the case of the Cuban 
missile crisis—to adjust to new high-
ranking political leaders who were in a 
position to replace him if they thought 
it necessary to do so� His ability to make 
known in speeches and writings the 
important role that a navy can play in 
expanding the power and influence of a 
country, as well as defending it against 
potential enemies, was also an asset to 
him� Yet the admiral also knew that war 
was not the only context in which a navy 
could be useful� Even in peacetime it was 
important to have a strong navy, because 
possession of such could give a country 
important advantages, such as prestige 
and potential� Interestingly, “Gorshkov’s 
genius was not simply to grow his 
Navy, it was to justify its existence as 
an arm of the state in peacetime and 
in operations that fell short of all-out 
war” (p� 10)� He was truly an effective 
advocate for his chosen profession�
Realistically, this book will be a guide 
to nations whose intentions include 
expanding their influence on a global 
scale via the use of a navy� Although 
there may be a number of countries 
in this category, China and India are 
current examples� Yet perhaps a major 
benefit of the book is that it provides 
a learning experience for future naval 
officers who aspire to a high military 
position in which they will encounter 
many challenges similar to those 
Admiral Gorshkov faced, despite the 
changing complexities of naval military 
activity� We always can learn from the 
past� Hence, a new generation of officers 
may be helped in the future by becom-
ing aware of the challenges Admiral 
Gorshkov faced and how he overcame 
them to make the Russian navy one 
of the strongest in the world today�
WILLIAM E� KELLY
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